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Abstract
In a number of papers on their theory of Inequity Aversion, E. Fehr and K.
Schmidt have claimed that the theory explains the behavior in many experi-
ments.
By virtue of having an infinite number of parameters the theory can predict a
wide range of outcomes, from the competitive to the cooperative. Its prediction
depends on values of these parameters.
Fehr & Schmidt provide no explicit methodological plan for their project and
as a result they repeatedly make logical and methodological errors. We look at
the methodology of their explanations and find that no connection has been
established between the experimental data and the behavior predicted by the
theory. We conclude that the theory of inequity aversion has no explanatory
value beyond its trivial capacity to predict a broad range of outcomes as a
function of its parameters.
1 Introduction
The theory of Inequity Aversion was introduced by E. Fehr and K. Schmidt
in [Fehr and Schmidt 1999]. Its aim was to provide a unified interpretation of
seemingly contradictory experimental evidence in one-shot games, which cannot
be explained by the traditional assumption of rational selfish agents. The theory
of Inequity Aversion asserts that individuals have preferences over the distrib-
ution of payoffs in their group and that they are averse to inequity. Except for
this departure from the traditional selfish preferences, the theory continues to
assume that all individuals act rationally and maximize their utility, given their
preferences and their information about the preferences of others.
The theory does not restrict the distribution of inequity aversion in the
population, its predictions, therefore, depend on the composition of the relevant
population. For any given game the theory’s prediction depends on how inequity
averse the population is. If all individuals are rather selfish, the prediction will
not differ much from that of the traditional theory with selfish preferences, while
if many individuals care a great deal about equity, the theory will tend to predict
fair, egalitarian outcomes. Thus, there is a broad spectrum of outcomes that are
compatible with the theory, depending on how inequity averse the population
is.
At this point the theory has little explanatory value since it is compatible
with nearly all behaviors. It is obvious that by adding some individuals with
a built-in preference for egalitarian allocations the theory can be compatible
with experimental behavior that cannot be explained by the traditional selfish
model applied to one-shot games. Still, the model could have served as a useful
theoretical tool to study the interactions between selfish and inequity averse
individuals, but Fehr and Schmidt wanted to achieve much more than that.
Fehr and Schmidt intended to improve the explanatory power of their theory by
calibrating the model (fixing a population) and using this population to explain
the experimental behavior in various games.
The theory has immediately won great popularity among economists, not
least because of the authors’ claim that the theory can explain many experi-
ments. Google Scholar, the search engine for scholarly literature, lists (in July
2006) over 1200 citations of the paper.
Since their original paper, Fehr & Schmidt continued to write a number of
papers in which they use the calibrated model to explain various experiments.
The underlying assumption of the theory is that each individual has a fixed
degree of inequity aversion. In their latest paper Fehr & Schmidt admit that
the behavior of the individuals does not fit the theory, but they continue to
use a calibration of the model. Using a calibration of the model, despite the
fact that individuals do not follow the theory, amounts to assuming that, rather
mysteriously, the population as a whole has a fixed distribution of inequity
aversion. However, throughout their papers, Fehr & Schmidt do not keep their
calibration fixed.
Fehr & Schmidt prove detailed propositions based on their calibrations, but
they do not test these predictions, they only confirm that the theory’s final con-
clusion (choice of contract) matches the data. The theory’s detailed predictions
are the fundamental and crucial factors from which the final conclusion is de-
rived. A closer look at the theory and the data reveals that the calibrated theory
strongly disagrees with the data, that the theory is irrelevant to the data, and
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that the agreement of the final conclusions does not show that the population
is motivated by inequity aversion considerations. The theory adds nothing to
the understanding of the data and has no explanatory value.
In addition, Fehr & Schmidt’s process of selecting the calibration is riddled
with methodological errors. When they select the calibration (in [Fehr and
Schmidt 1999]) Fehr & Schmidt use the data of some of the experiments which
they intend to explain. Having selected the calibration, they do not keep it
fixed. To fit the data of their ’most important’ experiment, the only experiment
(discussed in this paper) in which the subjects show some degree of cooperation,
they manipulate the calibration by adding a correlation of its variables. Despite
their efforts, the calibrated model is incompatible with this experiment.
Fehr & Schmidt do not refer to these methodological problems, nor do they
lay out an explicit methodology for their project. Fehr & Schmidt do not make
it clear what they mean by ’explaining the experiments’, they seem to change
their methods between papers, but they do not discuss explicitly what they
intend to do..
In this paper I critically review the methods used by Fehr & Schmidt in their
various articles and appraise the overall explanatory value of their theory. I look
mainly at the following 4 papers: [Fehr and Schmidt 1999], [Fehr and Schmidt
2004a], [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006b] (forthcoming in Econometrica), and
[Fehr, Kremhelmer, and Schmidt 2005],
I will show how the absence of methodology lead Fehr & Schmidt to repeat-
edly make basic logical and fatal methodological errors in their arguments. The
result of their efforts is that the calibration and the propositions they prove are
of little use, they fail to establish a connection between the theory’s predicted
equilibria and the experimental behavior. The theory of Inequity Aversion does
not provide an explanation of the data.
Fehr & Schmidt aimed to convince their readers that the behavior in many
experiments can be explained by their theory. They have failed in their project.
The theory of inequity aversion does not further our understanding of the exper-
imental behavior beyond the trivial statement that by manipulating the infinite
parameters of the population’s preferences it is probably possible to find some
compatibility between the theory and any experiment.
In a pamphlet I circulated on the Internet in March 2005 [Shaked 2005],
I have shown how the lacunae left by the missing methodology, were filled by
rhetoric, hyperboles, overstatement of results and cavalier treatment of data.
Fehr & Schmidt have replied to my pamphlet and circulated their response on
the internet [Fehr and Schmidt 2005].
It is not easy to separate methodology from rhetoric, both contribute to the
real and the perceived explanatory value of a theory. When logical arguments
are weak, rhetoric tends to have the upper hand. The reader who wishes to
learn about the rhetorical devices applied by Fehr & Schmidt in these papers,
can find them in some of the appendices of this paper.
The special nature of this paper requires a large amount of substantiating
evidence in the form of citations, quotations and computations. In order to be
short and smoothen the reading of these facts, I have put most of the evidence
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in extensive appendices. The trusting reader need not read these appendices,
although they can be read on their own as an entertaining cautionary tale.
Throughout the paper I refer to the authors as F&S, with apologies to A.
Klein and S. Kremhelmer.
2 F&S’ Explanatory Methods
2.1 The Theory of Inequity Aversion
F&S propose the following utility function as representing their Inequity Aver-
sion for a population of n individuals:
Ui (x1, x2, ...xn) = xi −
αi
n− 1
X
j 6=i
max {xj − xi, 0}
− βi
n− 1
X
j 6=i
max {xi − xj , 0} ,
where 0 < βi < 1, βi ≤ αi
For 2 individuals, this becomes:
U1 (x1, x2) = x1 − [α1max {x2 − x1, 0}+ β1max {x1 − x2, 0}] .
The parameter α measures the envy of being poorer than another individual,
while the parameter β measures the discomfort of being better off. The utility
function is normalized by the factor n−1, where n is the size of the population.
The utility function allows an individual to behave altruistically or spitefully
depending on the distribution of payoffs.
Each individual is characterized by a pair of parameters (α, β) , and the
population by a joint distribution of α, β.
The theory does not specify the distribution of α, β in the population, it is
a theory with, potentially, an infinite number of parameters. By varying the
population one can obtain a spectrum of predictions ranging from the compet-
itive to the cooperative. Clearly, for any given game, the theory’s prediction
will depend on the degree of inequity aversion in the population. If most of
the individuals in the population are selfish, the outcome will be close to the
competitive selfish equilibrium, while if a large proportion of the individuals is
highly inequity averse, the outcome is likely to be cooperative and egalitarian.
Thus, for a given measure of cooperativeness it is possible to find a population
for which the theory predicts this degree of cooperation.
In their QJE article [Fehr and Schmidt 1999], F&S calibrated the theory by
using data on Ultimatum Games, they intended to hold this calibration constant
and use the calibrated theory to explain the behavior in a number of experiments
(for the little that F&S say about their methodology see Appendix A.1, p. 18).
F&S discuss 4 types of experiments in their paper: markets games with
proposers’ and with responders’ competition, and public good games with and
without punishments.
F&S study the following experiments in their article:
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1. AMarket with Proposers’ Competition, [Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara,
and Zamir 1991].
A number of proposers make offers to a single responder who is restricted
to accept (or reject) the highest offer. One of the proposers who made the
highest offer is chosen at random to divide the surplus with the responder.
The outcome in the experiment was the competitive one, the proposers
offered all the surplus to the responder, (for the special features of this
game, see Appendix A.2, p. 18).
2. A Market with Responders’ Competition, [Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere
1997].
A proposer makes a single offer to a number of responders. Among those
who accepted the offer a random responder is chosen to divide the surplus
with the proposer. In the experiment about 80% of the responders were
willing to accept any offer.
3. Public Good Games without Punishment.
In these games a number of identical individuals with income y may con-
tribute part of their income towards a public good. A player may con-
tribute an amount g of his income, which becomes an amount ag (a < 1) of
the public good and is enjoyed by all, including himself In the experiments
about 73% did not contribute at all.
4. Public Good Game with Punishment, [Fehr and Gächter 2000].
This game is like the public good game without punishment, with an
additional last stage in which individuals may punish others with a cost to
themselves. In this experiment about 80% of the individuals contributed
all their income in the first stage.
The Calibration
F&S use data on Ultimatum Game (UG) to calibrate their model. According
to the theory, the behavior of an inequity averse responder in the ultimatum
game is solely determined by his envy parameter (α) and that of a proposer
(who is assumed to know the α distribution of the responders) by his discomfort
parameter β. The distribution of β can be calculated from data on the proposers’
offers, while the distribution of α can be calculated from data on the responders’
acceptance and rejection rates.
All that can be said about a proposer who made an offer ≥ 1/2, is that
his β is greater than 0.5 (Proposition 1, p.826). Unless the experimental data
explicitly details how an individual subject behaved as responder and as a pro-
poser, the data can provide no information about the joint distribution of α, β.
The data provides only partial and separate information on each of the marginal
distributions of the two parameters.
F&S do not present any individually detailed data, they can therefore com-
pute only the marginal distributions of α and β. In addition, F&S inform us
that 40% of the proposers made the offer 1/2, thus the theory, in conjunction
with the data, does not pin down the β values of 40% of the proposers, it merely
states that β ≥ 0.5.
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Figure 1: The QJE Calibration (the marginal distributions) [Fehr and
Schmidt 1999] p. 844
Clearly, the model is underidentified. The data cannot determine a unique
calibration, there is a large set of distributions which are compatible with the
data, this leaves F&S the freedom to select one among them.
F&S make no attempt to use statistical, econometric or other scientific meth-
ods to determine the distributions of α, β0s in the population. The values for
the distribution of α0s cannot be derived from the presented data, and for the
40% of the proposers who made the offer 1/2, F&S simply choose the value
β = 0.6 without justifying their choice.
The final selection of the two marginal distributions is presented in figure 1.
I will refer to it as the QJE calibration, (for the use of the ultimatum games
data for the calibration, see Appendix A.3, p.19).
The value 0.6 for the high β0s was not chosen arbitrarily. For each game, F&S
provide propositions that specify conditions for the existence of an equilibrium
which is similar to the experimental behavior in this game. For the experiment
of Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere, Proposition 3 (p.832) requires that there
should be sufficient individuals with β < 56 = 0.83¯. To explain the public good
experiment of Fehr and Gächter [Fehr and Gächter 2000] it is necessary that all
the individuals with β ≥ 0.5 will have β ≥ 1− 0.4 = 0.6 (Proposition 5, p.841),
i.e. there should be no individuals with 0 < β < 0.6. F&S have chosen the
value β = 0.6 which happens to satisfy the two requirements 0.6 ≤ β < 0.83¯.
F&S have not used any scientific method to select the value of β which could
have assumed any value in [0.5, 1).
Later in their paper, after selecting the calibration, F&S study the public
good game with punishment (Fehr and Gächter). To ensure the existence of a
cooperative equilibrium in which individuals contribute to the public good (as
subjects do in the experiments), there should exist individuals who have both
high α0s and high β0s (the ‘conditionally cooperative enforcers’ in Proposition
5). As we have seen, the data of the ultimatum game provides no information on
a correlation between the variables. To fit the requirements of the proposition,
F&S introduce a perfect correlation between the variables α, β to the calibration
of Table III. The new, manipulated, calibration is given by figure 2 (for the way
the correlation was introduced, see Appendix A.4, p.19):
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Figure 2: The QJE Calibration with the Added Correlation
Can a calibration that was selected with the help of some data explain this
data? When using a calibration obtained from the data on UG to explain the
behavior in an experiment A, one should make sure that the data to be ex-
plained plays no role in selecting the calibration. If the calibration was selected
independently of the experimental data of A, then it may explain the behavior
in A. If the selection of the calibration was not independent of A, then it may
have been selected for the purpose of fitting the predictions of the calibrated
theory to the data of A. In that case, the calibration cannot explain the behav-
ior in A. The most that can be claimed is that a distribution has been found
which is compatible with both data sets of UG and of A. Clearly the first case
(explanation) is logically stronger, it implies the second (compatibility).
The selection of a calibration can be said to be independent of an experiment
A, if it was made before the data for A was available, or alternatively, if a well
established statistical or econometric method has been used to select the cali-
bration. In all other cases the calibration cannot be assumed to be independent
of the data and it would be wrong to claim that it can explain the data that
was instrumental in its selection.
The data of the experiments was available to F&S when they selected the
calibration. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that they have chosen
this value independently of the data.
Although there is no reference to it in the paper, the choice of β = 0.6
was not a mere coincidence. In their reply to my pamphlet [Fehr and Schmidt
2005], F&S admit that their choice of the value β = 0.6 for the calibration was
influenced by the data of the experiments that were claimed to be explained by
this same calibration They justify their choice by explaining that β = 0.8 is an
extreme β value, that β = 0.6 seems a plausible value, that it is more realistic
to assume a continuous distribution of β0s and that it seems plausible that
someone with a high β has also a high α (p. 5, 6, 7 in [Fehr and Schmidt 2005]).
All these arguments come too late in the process, F&S should have introduced
them as additional assumptions to their theory, before considering the particular
experiments (for F&S’ version of how they selected the calibration, see Appendix
A.5, p.19).
The data of two experiments (Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere and of Fehr
and Gächter) was instrumental in selecting the QJE calibration. Therefore, the
calibrated theory cannot explain these experiments. The most that can be said
is that F&S have found a calibration which is compatible with the data of these
experiments.
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The Public Good Experiments.
Despite these stratagems, the calibrated theory is not compatible with any
of the public good experiments. For Public Good Games without Punishments,
the calibrated theory predicts that nearly 100% of the individuals should not
contribute to the public good. However, in the experiments, only about 73% did
not contribute to the public good (Table II, p.838). The discrepancy between the
theory and the data is very large, 100−7373 = 36.9%, the theory is not compatible
with the data, (for F&S’ reference to this gap, see Appendix A.6, p.20).
For the Public Good Game with Punishment [Fehr and Gächter 2000],
Proposition 5 requires that the population consists of two types only, the
‘conditionally cooperative enforces’ - individuals (with β ≥ 0.6 and a corre-
spondingly high α), and selfish ones (with α = β = 0). The QJE calibration has
4 types, about 30% of the population have intermediate values of α, β and are
are neither selfish nor ‘conditionally cooperative enforcers’. Proposition 5 does
not apply to the QJE calibration, it is based on a different calibration, and as a
result it has not been shown that the calibrated theory is compatible with the
behavior in this experiment.
A Summary of the Explanation Provided by the QJE Article.
To summarize the achievements of the QJE article, we go through the list
of experiments that were discussed in that article:
1. F&S succeeded in explaining the behavior in the market experiment with
proposers’ competition [Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir 1991].
F&S prove that irrespective of the composition of the population, the pre-
dicted outcome is always the competitive one. However, the rules of this
game do not allow the players to freely practice their inequity aversion if
they have any (see Appendix A.2, p.18).
2. The data of the market experiment with responders’ competition [Güth,
Marchand, and Rulliere 1997] influenced the calibration selection, there-
fore, it cannot explain the data.. However, the data is compatible with
theory’s prediction.
3. The behavior in the public good experiments without punishment has not
been shown to be compatible with the theory’s prediction.
4. The data of the public good experiment with punishments [Fehr and
Gächter 2000] was instrumental in selecting the calibration. It was used
to determine the parameter values and later their correlation. The propo-
sition, which should have provided a link between the calibrated theory
and the experiment, does not apply to the calibration. F&S failed to show
that the data is even compatible with the calibration. Note that this is
the only experiment, among the four discussed in this paper, in which the
players cooperate.
The calibrated theory succeeded in explaining one competitive situation and
be compatible with the data of another competitive game, none of the public
good games has been shown to be compatible with the calibrated theory. F&S
were particularly interested in providing a unified theory which will simultane-
ously explain the free riding in public good games without punishment and the
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contributions in the public good game with punishment. Their theory failed to
explain or even be compatible with these experiments. F&S failed to produce
a single population that can explain the experiments they considered in [Fehr
and Schmidt 1999]. The theory did not add anything to our understanding of
the experimental behavior. It has little or no explanatory value.
2.2 Explaining Contract Choices.
Since introducing the theory of inequity aversion in [Fehr and Schmidt 1999],
F&S conducted a number of experiments concerning choice between various con-
tracts, these were analyzed and explained with the calibrated inequity aversion
theory.
F&S have publicly declared (in [Fehr and Schmidt 2005]) that it is on the
basis of these experiments that they felt confident to claim that their calibrated
QJE model yields quantitatively accurate predictions, (for F&S’ declarations,
see Appendix B.1, p.20).
In this section I look at the methods applied by F&S in 3 papers: [Fehr and
Schmidt 2004a], [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006b] (fothcoming in Economet-
rica), and [Fehr, Kremhelmer, and Schmidt 2005] I refer to these papers as the
Contract Papers.
The 3 contract papers have the traditional structure of an experiment fol-
lowed by a theory, and F&S claim to explain and interpret the experimental
results with the calibrated model (for F&S’ claims, see Appendix B.2, p.21).
A number of points should be noted about these papers:
1. Despite their claim that these papers support the QJE calibration, none of
the papers uses the QJE calibration, F&S have switched to use a different
calibration.
2. Although the calibrated theory makes some clear and simple predictions
about the fundamental behavior in equilibrium, F&S do not test these
predictions. We test these predictions and find that they do not match
the data.
3. F&S select some general patterns (‘qualitative patterns’ ) from the data
and the theory. They claim that these patterns agree in the theory and
the data, and on the basis of these patterns they conclude that the data is
’largely consistent’ with the theory. We study these patterns and find that
none of them shows that inequity aversion is relevant to the experiments.
The models of these three papers differ in their details but the reasoning
and intuition driving them is the same. I concentrate here on that part of the
experiments in which players choose between Bonus and Incentive contracts
[Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006b], between A-ownership and Joint ownership
[Fehr, Kremhelmer, and Schmidt 2005], or between a Piece-wise and a Bonus
contract [Fehr and Schmidt 2004a]. I use the terms and language of [Fehr, Klein,
and Schmidt 2006b], but, with slight variations, these apply to the models of
the other two papers.
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A principal offers a contract to an agent. The agent can then exert a costly
effort which produces a payoff for the principal. The principal may offer the
agent an Incentive, Trust or a Bonus contract. In an incentive contract the
principal may invest in verification technology, he names a wage, he demands
an effort level and specifies a fine to be paid if the agent made a lower effort.
In a Bonus contract the principal names a wage, an effort level and a bonus
which he may pay. Here, neither the agent’s effort nor the principal’s bonus are
contractually enforceable. A Trust contract is like the bonus contract without
the last stage, the stage in which the principal may pay a bonus.
The papers contain some other experimental treatments, but I will refer only
to the Bonus/Incentive or Bonus/Trust treatment, and in particular I will look
at the behavior under the bonus contract. The Bonus contract game is a nat-
ural environment to test the theory. In all other contracts (Incentive and Trust
contracts) F&S tie the hands of the players and prevent them from making a
unilateral payment to others at the end of the game. This can be easily achieved
in an experiment, but if the preferences of the inequity averse individuals are
to be taken seriously, this seems a rather unnatural restriction. It is not easy
to imagine a situation in which a player is prevented from anonymously mailing
some money to another, if he really wishes to do so. If this payment is permit-
ted, then an inequity averse principal will obey his nature and compensate his
agent whenever he (the principal) has a higher payoff. If all agents are aware
that (some) principals will pay a bonus, the situation is equivalent to a bonus
contract.
We now investigate the methodology applied by F&S in these papers and
evaluate its explanatory value.
Tailoring Calibrations to Experiments.
The QJE calibration is not used in the contract papers. The population,
is assumed to consist of 60% selfish individuals (with α = β = 0), and 40%
highly inequity averse, fair individuals, with high but unspecified inequity aver-
sion parameters α, β > 0.5. To create this new set of distributions F&S have
eliminated 30% of the QJE population, (those individuals with intermediate val-
ues α = 0.5, β = 0.25) and correspondingly increased the weight of the selfish
individuals. They also allow the inequity averse individuals to have any (high)
values of α, β and not only β = 0.6 and α = 1, or α = 4 as in the QJE distribu-
tion. Clearly, there are many types of fair players, depending on their α, β, but
F&S ensure that all of them behave identically in equilibrium. I refer to this
population as a 40− 60 distribution (for some properties of the 40− 60 distrib-
ution and how F&S change the calibrations in their appendices, see Appendix
B.3, p.21).
Obviously, the QJE calibration is not one of the 40 − 60 distributions. In
the QJE calibration 30% of the population has intermediate values of both α
and β, which are neither 0 nor higher than 0.5.
The 40 − 60 distribution with its unspecified values of α, β is incompatible
with 3 of the experiments in the QJE paper [Fehr and Schmidt 1999], (see
Appendix B.4, p.22).
There is no attempt to show that the QJE calibration is compatible with
the data of the contract experiments. The move from the QJE calibration to
the 40 − 60 distribution can be justified if the individuals with intermediate
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inequity aversion (who no longer exist in the new distribution) would behave, in
the contract games, like the selfish individuals with whom they were grouped.
But this is not the case, it is easy to verify that in the proposed equilibrium
(given the equilibrium behavior of the principals), the agents with the QJE
intermediate values of α = 0.5 (and β = 0.25) will behave like the fair agents
(with α > 0.5) and not like the selfish ones (with α = 0).
F&S make no attempt to reconcile the new 40 − 60 distribution with the
experiments discussed in [Fehr and Schmidt 1999]. F&S do not discuss the
problems of switching between calibrations, and when they present the new
distribution, they downplay the differences between it and the QJE calibra-
tion by using ambiguous and ill-defined terms (for F&S’ description of the new
calibration, see Appendix B.5, p.22).
In their attempts to explain experimental behavior, F&S fitted different
calibrations to different experiments. The experiments in [Fehr and Schmidt
1999] were ‘explained’ with the QJE calibration, while the contract experiments
use the new distribution.
Is there any explanatory value in fitting different populations to different
experiments? Tailoring populations to experiments has no explanatory value
since it is obvious that by selecting a suitable population the theory’s prediction
can freely change.
Moreover, explaining different experiments with different populations am-
ounts to saying that the degree of inequity aversion in a population changes
with the situation (game) it faces. While this may be true, this statement does
not add anything to our understanding of the experimental behavior, unless
accompanied by a theory predicting how the degree of inequity aversion changes
with the situation. Such a theory will have to explain how facing a particular
game causes individuals to change their preferences, it will also have to explain
how this changing distribution becomes known to all players, (F&S assume that,
in equilibrium, all players are familiar with the correct distribution of inequity
aversion in the population). In effect, such a theory will select an equilibrium
according to a social norm. F&S have not yet proposed such a dynamic theory
of inequity aversion.
The Neglected Predictions and the Qualitative Patterns.
We come now to the 2nd and 3rd points we noted earlier, that F&S test only
selected ‘qualitative’ predictions of their theory. In the theoretical parts of these
papers, F&S provide minutely detailed propositions which make very precise
predictions of the fundamental behavior in the studied games. The proposi-
tions predict the proportions of agents who exert low effort and of principals
who reward cooperation, these fundamental properties determine the players’
payoffs and the contract they choose. In addition, these predictions are simple,
straightforward and can be easily tested, yet, F&S do not test them. All they
test are some general behavioral patterns, which they term ‘qualitative’, these
include the choice of contracts in the theory and the experiment. On the basis
of the ‘qualitative’ features F&S claim that the theory is ‘largely consistent’
with the data. Below, we describe the theory’s predictions and the qualitative
patterns, we test them, and find that the theory’s predictions are incompatible
with the data and that those qualitative patterns that agree with the theory do
not add to the theory’s explanatory value.
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Why do F&S test the qualitative patterns, but stop short of testing the
theory’s quantitative predictions? Why are some of the theory’s predictions
valid for testing and others are ignored? Is there a logical distinction between
the two which justifies the different treatment? F&S do not refer to these
questions and they offer no answers, it is left to us to find the logic in their
scheme.
Indeed, the theory’s predictions are directly based on the 40−60 calibration
which F&S use for these games. F&S went out of their way to convince us that
this calibration is relevant to their model, but when it comes to the test they
treat it as irrelevant, (for F&S’ statements about the relevance of the 40 − 60
distribution, see Appendix B.6, p.23).
In two of the contract papers F&S inform us, rather casually, that the qual-
itative results of their propositions hold for a wider class of calibrations, (for
a description of these calibrations and how F&S present them, see Appendix
B.7, p.23). A careful examination of the papers reveals that the proofs of the
proposition do not mention other calibrations, nor do F&S make any use of this
wider class in their arguments.
What is the purpose of this information? If the 40− 60 calibration explains
the data, why are other calibrations required? Are we being told, in a subtle,
indirect way, that the 40 − 60 calibration may not be compatible with the
data, but that some other calibration may be more successful? Whatever this
information is meant to convey, F&S do not make any use of it, and they do
not test the more detailed predictions of any of the calibrations.
In the equilibria considered by F&S, all individuals of a certain type be-
have identically. Thus there are at most 4 cases, a fair principal meets a fair
agent, a fair principal meets a selfish agent, etc. The equilibrium specifies the
frequencies of these cases in the population, the data can be easily tested for
these frequencies. In the equilibrium, all principals offer the bonus contract, all
selfish agents expend high effort and all fair agents a low one, selfish principals
pay no bonus and fair principals reward only selfish agents.
The intuition for this equilibrium is straightforward and is clearly presented
in all the papers. An agent who makes a high effort reaches an unequal allocation
in which he has the short end. Under a bonus contract, the agent is sure
to be compensated by the fair principals (those with a built in preference for
egalitarian allocations).
Since not all of the principals are fair, the agent’s expected allocation is not
completely egalitarian but close to it. This partial bonus may suffice to induce
a selfish agent to expend high effort, whereas inequity averse agents may shun
this expected unequal allocation and opt for a more egalitarian allocation with
a lower, inefficient, effort level.
F&S compute their equilibrium only for a particular type of calibration.
They do not consider a population with more than two types (the selfish and
the fair), nor do they indicate how their equilibrium could be generalized to
populations with more varied types. In this model, a population with multiple
types is more than a theoretical nicety. The experimental data suggests that
there is no perfect correlation between the α, β parameters and that there are
more than two types in the population. Moreover, the equilibrium is not robust
to minor changes in the games’ parameters. The parameters of the games, the
production and cost functions, were carefully selected to support the equilibrium
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by making all fair players choose the low effort. Minor changes in the parameters
can destroy this equilibrium by inducing some of the fair agents to cooperate.
To describe an equilibrium with cooperation for such games would require a
calibration with more than two types (for a detailed description of how fragile
the equilibrium is, see Appendix B.8, p.24).
In [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006b] F&S admit that their individual subjects
do not behave according to inequity aversion theory, but they claim that the
aggregated data matches the theory. In appendix B.9, p.25, we test the data
and find that even on an aggregated level the data does not match the theory.
We show that the fractions of fair agents (those who expend low effort), and
of fair principals (those who reward high effort) do not match the calibrated
theory’s predictions. We find that the data suggests that the population in the
experiments is incompatible with the 40 − 60 calibration. There is no perfect
correlation between fair agents and fair principals, and the percentages of fair
agents and fair principals, as suggested by the data are far removed from those
of the calibration. Since in some experiment the percentage of fair agents is
much higher than that of fair principals while in another the reverse holds, the
data seems to suggest that no single distribution can explain all experiments.
In the experiment of [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006b], the fraction of fair
principals, suggested by the data, is so low that the theory, calibrated with a
population with that fraction of fair principals, predicts that under a bonus con-
tract there will be very little cooperation (selfish agents should exert rather low
effort, much lower than in the actual experiment). We also show that bonuses
are not paid to equalize payoffs, as the theory assumes, that agents payoff do
not match the theory and that the proportion of bonus to total compensation
is not as the theory predicts.
The tests show that the data does not match the fundamental behavior
predicted by the theory. The factors that determine the attractiveness of a
bonus contract relative to another contract are, among others, the fraction of
principals who pay a bonus, the magnitude of the bonuses and the degree of
agents cooperation. All these factors are incompatible with the experimental
behavior. The theory, its propositions and the choice of contract it predicts are
all irrelevant to the data.
Let us now consider in detail the ‘qualitative patterns’ which according to
F&S show that the theory is ‘largely consistent’ with the data. The detailed
tests and the relevant computations can be found in appendix B.9, p.25.
The main qualitative feature is that the principals choose the same contracts
in the theory and in the experiments: Bonus contract is preferred to Incentive
contract and Incentive contract to Trust contract. F&S commit a grave logical
error: the final conclusion of the theory, the choice of a contract, depends on
the underlying fundamental behavior under the two (or more) contracts, and
this behavior does not match in the theory and the data. If the final choice
happens to be the same in the theory and the experiment, it is not because of
inequity aversion behavior. If inequity aversion were the underlying reason for
the experimental contract choice, then the fundamental patterns of behavior in
the experiment would have followed the theory.
It is not only the subjects’ individual behavior that does not fit the theory, as
F&S themselves admit, it is also the fundamental aggregate behavior that does
not match the theory (percentages of cooperators, bonuses and payoffs). In what
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sense, then, does the theory rationalize the quantitative facts ([Fehr, Klein, and
Schmidt 2006b], p.25)? Can one conclude, despite all these discrepancies, that
it is inequity aversion that causes the subjects to choose the way they have?
Imagine that we have a theory about the moons of the planet Jupiter. The
theory states that Jupiter’s location in the solar system caused it to have high
temperature, and that this, in turn, caused explosions which created its moons.
We now observe the planet, we confirm that it has moons, but we find that
Jupiter’s temperature was never high, and we find no evidence of violent explo-
sions. On the basis of the confirmation of the qualitative pattern (that Jupiter
has moons) we conclude that the theory is largely consistent with the observa-
tions. As in this somewhat simplified example, inequity aversion theory offers
no explanation of the data.
The population in the experiments is incompatible with the calibration as-
sumed in the propositions and used to predict the equilibrium behavior. The
propositions and the theory’s predictions do not apply to the population of the
experiments.
For example: In the experiment of [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006b], the
population in the experiment has few fair principals (who pay a reward). There
are so few fair principals, that according to the theory, there should be very
little cooperation in the bonus contract (the effort levels chosen by all agents
will be rather low e ≤ 3.) If this is the case, it is very likely that the theory
predicts that, between a bonus and an incentive contract, the principals will
choose an incentive contract, contrary to what subjects do in the experiment.
By ignoring the relevant tests, F&S have applied an irrelevant theory to their
data.
A second qualitative feature considered by F&S is that in the experiments
the paid bonuses increase with the expended effort, and that the bonus forms a
substantial part of the agents’ payoff.
The only theoretical reason for an inequity averse principal to pay a bonus
is to equalize his payoff to that of his agent. For a given wage rate, this implies
that the bonus increases with effort in a particular way, and changes with the
level of effort (the derivative of the bonus w.r.t. effort is determined by the
production and cost functions). Note that the property of equating payoffs is
independent of the calibration.
Rather than test the fundamental assumption of the model that bonuses
are paid to equalize payoffs, F&S test only whether bonuses increase with the
effort expended by the agent. They run a regression and find that the average
increase of bonus per unit of effort is such that a rational selfish agent would
indeed choose the equilibrium level of effort. The test should have been whether
the bonus varies with effort as the theory predicts.
F&S commit the same logical error as in the previous qualitative pattern.
Even if it is found that bonuses increase with effort, this does not mean that the
principals follow the inequity aversion theory. The real test should be whether
bonuses attempt to equalize the payoffs of the principal and his agent. For two
of the experiments, [Fehr and Schmidt 2004a], [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006b],
we show (see appendix B.9) that the bonuses paid in the experiment do not
equalize the payoffs of the principal and the agent. If, despite that, bonuses
increase with effort, it does not demonstrate that it is because individuals are
inequity averse. (It is also trivially true that if for some experiment all positive
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bonuses equalize payoffs, one can easily find a population with an appropriate
proportion of selfish to fair principals which will be compatible with this data).
The same holds for the statement about the share of the bonus in the agents’
payoffs. The underlying reason for paying the bonus is different in the theory
and the data, hence the observation that the bonus is a substantial part of
the payoff does not show that players are inequity averse. It is therefore not
surprising that a test and comparison of the theoretical and experimental share
of bonus/payoff finds them to be very different and incompatible.
Another qualitative pattern noted by F&S is that, in the experiments, bonus
contracts have outcomes which are more efficient than those of a trust contract.
Although all the theoretical results in the papers depend strongly on F&S’
choice of the game parameters (See Appendix B.8, p.24), F&S present one single
proposition which is robust to changes in the game parameters. They show that
a bonus contract is (weakly) more efficient than a trust contract. The proof
holds for any parameters of the game (production and cost functions) and any
population with q ∈ [0, 1] fair individuals (α, β > 0.5) and 1 − q selfish ones.
(see proposition 6, p.A− 8 of the appendix [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006a]).
In a trust contract the principal announces a wage and the agent reacts by
choosing an effort level. In a bonus contract there is an additional move by the
principal, in which he can pay the agent a bonus. In a trust contract the inequity
averse principal, against his preferences (his β parameter), is not allowed to pay
the agent and is prevented from reaching an egalitarian allocation. It is therefore
clear that for any wage paid in the first stage and any belief q of the agent, the
agent will be (weakly) more cooperative and efficient under the bonus contract.
Stripped of its contractual jargon, this statement merely says that the bonus
game has an additional stage in which the mover (if he is better off than the
other) may practically announce the two players to be a team and share any
profits they may have. Whatever the actions taken by the principal in the first
stage, the extra move added to the bonus contract cannot reduce efficiency,
and it certainly increases efficiency when q is sufficiently large (F&S provide a
scholarly, 3 pages long, proof of this observation).
This qualitative feature (that bonus contracts are more efficient than trust
contracts) is really about the agents’ belief about the existence of individuals
who may make use of the additional move. It is not about the existence of such
individuals. If, in some experiment, we observe that bonus contracts are more
efficient, it shows that, like F&S, some agents believe that some of the principals
will pay a bonus. It does not confirm that individuals are inequity averse, only
that some individuals believe that others may be. F&S have not tested the
agents’ beliefs, and there is no reason to believe that the agents’ beliefs are
correct (the experimental behavior does not match the predicted equilibrium).
Yet another qualitative pattern presented by F&S is that although the
bonuses paid in the experiments are high, some agents do not cooperate and
expend low effort. According to the theory, those individual who choose a low
level of effort, do so because of their high α value. The observation that some
agents do not cooperate does not confirm the theory, the agents may shirk be-
cause they do not believe that there are any inequity averse individuals in the
population. As the previous qualitative pattern this one is about agents’ beliefs
about the existence of principals who pay the reward.
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Although F&S avoid any quantitative tests, in [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt
2006b] they quantitatively compare the data and the theory. They discover
that the average wage offered in a bonus contract, the average bonus and the
average effort level agree in the experiment and the theory (the averages are
based on the 40− 60 distribution).
But averages are not a satisfactory measure, "they may frequently hide dif-
ferences at a more disaggregated level", (a quotation from [Fehr and Schmidt
2004a], p. 463). We have shown that the underlying empirical behavior does not
agree with the theoretical predictions. The wage paid and the effort expended
depend on the fractions of fair principals and fair agents and these are different
in the theory and the data. The rationale for paying bonuses is not the same in
the theory and practice. In addition, F&S admit in the paper that the subjects’
individual behavior does not match the theory (p.25), it is therefore clear that
the accord between the averages that was noted by F&S is a mere coincidence.
Based on this accidental equality of averages, F&S exclaim 4 (!) times in their
paper that their theory provides surprisingly accurate and remarkably precise
quantitative predictions of the details of the bonus contract ([Fehr, Klein, and
Schmidt 2006b], pps. 4, 21, 25, 29) These statements are clearly misleading.
The following test would be a more suitable one: according to the theory
(with the 40− 60 distribution), the average bonus paid to an agent who made
a high effort is 0.4 ∗ 25 = 10, the empirical average bonus paid to an agent
who made a high effort ≥ 5 is 1811127 = 14.26, (Table V, [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt
2006b], or 2767213 = 13 according to Table 5 [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006a]).
This is a discrepancy of the order of 30− 42%.
In all their references to these accurate predictions F&S describe them as
‘surprising’. What is it that F&S find so surprising about these averages? The
above quotation from their previous paper shows that F&S are aware that two
completely different distributions may share the same average. Could it be that
they use ‘surprising’ as a subtle reminder to the reader of the serendipitous and
accidental nature of this result?
F&S are apparently so confident that it suffices to confirm the compatibility
of some ‘qualitative patterns’, that they do not even propose to test the fun-
damental predictions of the theory. Obviously, the referees and editors of the
journals that publish these papers, share their confidence, since they did not
require F&S to run these tests. As a result, none of the qualitative patterns
shows that inequity aversion is relevant to the data. Figure 3 describes the
logical structure of the predictions, and the mismatch between the theory and
the data.
A Summary of the Explanation provided by the Contract Papers.
F&S abandoned the QJE calibration and started using a new one. In effect,
they tailor different calibrations to different experiments. They claim that the
theory predicts some general features of the experimental data but they avoid
testing the theory’s simple and fundamental predictions, which turn out to be
incompatible with the data. The calibrated theory predicts behavior that is so
far removed from the experimental data, that it is clear that the experimental
population and the calibration are very different. This means that the theory’s
predictions do not apply to the population of the experiments.
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Figure 3: The crossed boxes contain theoretical predictions that do not match
the data. Those in the oval boxes agree with the data
Moreover, the data suggests that there is no single calibration that is com-
patible with all the experiments, each experiment requires a completely different
calibration. The qualitative patterns considered by F&S do not show that the
experimental behavior is due to inequity aversion preferences. The theory pro-
vides no explanation of the experimental data, it has no explanatory value.
In their latest paper [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006b], F&S conclude by
admitting that their model fails to provide a good description of the behavior
of individual subjects, but that ‘on average subjects behave as if they were
motivated by inequity aversion’. We have seen that it is not only the individual
behavior, but also the aggregate behavior that is incompatible with the theory.
One would be justified in using the as if approach if the final conclusions of
the theory agree with the data, but currently there are no available methods to
test the theory’s intermediate predictions. However, in this case, the theory’s
intermediate predictions can be directly tested and are found to be completely
incompatible with the data. It is meaningless and misleading to claim that the
subjects behave as if motivated by inequity aversion and that the theory ‘helps
to organize and interpret the data’.
3 Conclusion
F&S wanted to present a theory that provides a unified explanation to many
different situations which cannot be explained by the traditional selfish prefer-
ences assumption applied to one-shot games. However, F&S have not laid out
a consistent methodology for their project. The absence of a sound foundation
caused them to commit grave logical errors, and as a result their project has
failed. While clear methodology is absent, the reader is confronted with am-
16
biguous phrases and misleading statements not only in their papers but also in
the public and open discussion of their theory (for a description of the rhetoric
in F&S papers, see Appendix B.10, p.31).
The sum total of F&S work amounts to manipulating calibrations in an
attempt to fit data, tailoring distributions to experiments, ignoring predictions
which do not fit the data and relying on general ’qualitative patterns’ which
do not support the theory. By using these questionable methods, F&S have
failed to show that the calibrated theory of inequity aversion is relevant to the
experiments.
The general treatment of the calibration in these papers, may indicate that
the calibration was not meant to be taken too seriously. Perhaps the aim of these
papers was merely to state that experiments show that some individuals are
motivated by inequity aversion. But if neither the number of these individuals
nor their degree of inequity aversion is specified, then this statement is trivially
true. By fine-tuning the infinite parameters of the model nearly anything can
be explained. There is no need to run any experiments nor prove any theorems
to understand this rather simple point.
Otherwise, the theory has added nothing to our understanding of the ex-
periments, F&S have not advanced us beyond the obvious observation that the
theory can make a wide range of predictions depending on how inequity averse
the population is.
It seems that the only purpose of the theory in these papers is to provide
a pretense of scientific veneer to the authors’ conjectures about the reasons for
the subjects’ behavior in the experiments. However, the experiments and F&S’
conjectures are interesting, intriguing, and do not require the superfluous theory.
The experiments and F&S’ conjectures could stand on their own and possibly
be published in a journal that puts less emphasis on needless theory, provided
they are presented for what they really are: an erudite speculation.
I have no doubt that F&S and the hundreds of their followers firmly believe
that it is the existence of inequity averse individuals that is responsible for the
experimental behavior in many games, and indeed they may be right. But by
using dubious methods, F&S have failed to convince the uninitiated.
F&S devoted an impressive number of pages to prove a large number of
propositions applying the theory of Inequity Aversion to various games. While
these propositions may be of some theoretical interest, they are superfluous
since the equilibria they describe do not apply to the data. F&S would have
done better proving less theorems and devoting some serious thought to the
methodology of their project.
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Appendix
A The QJE Paper
A.1 The Methodology.
In [Fehr and Schmidt 1999], F&S do not inform us what their methodology is.
It is only in a later survey article [Fehr and Schmidt 2003] that we learn that
F&S intended to keep the calibration in their QJE paper constant:
"Using the data that is available from many experiments on the ulti-
matum game, Fehr and Schmidt calibrate the distribution of α and β
in the population. Keeping this distribution constant, they show
that their model yields quantitatively accurate predictions across many
bargaining, market and co-operation games." [Fehr and Schmidt
2003], p.222.
F&S have not changed their minds about what they did in their QJE article.
In a recent survey article, soon to be published in the Handbook on Reciprocity,
Gift-Giving and Altruism [Fehr and Schmidt 2006], F&S repeat these statements
nearly word for word, referring to their QJE article, they say:
"Fehr and Schmidt choose a distribution for α and β that is consis-
tent with the experimental evidence of the ultimatum game. Keep-
ing this distribution fixed, they show that their model yields sur-
prisingly accurate predictions across many bargaining, market and
social dilemma games" [Fehr and Schmidt 2006], p.26.
The only noticeable difference between the two quotations is that the ‘quan-
titatively accurate predictions’ of the World Congress in 2000, turned into: ‘sur-
prisingly accurate predictions’ in the year 2006, (for other artful uses of ‘sur-
prise’, see p.15).
A.2 A Market with Proposers’ Competition.
It is worth noticing that in all their papers on inequity aversion, this experiment
is the only one that is fully explained by the theory. Its data was not instrumen-
tal in selecting the calibration, and the theory predicts the experimental data
perfectly. Moreover, the theoretical prediction is independent of the calibration.
The reason F&S included competitive games in their analysis was to demon-
strate that their theory does not clash with the established experimental re-
sults on competitive games. In competitive situations subjects, usually, play
competitively. This experiment can, of course, be explained by the traditional
selfish assumptions, but F&S wanted to show that in such a competitive situa-
tion even highly inequity averse individuals play competitively. To demonstrate
their point they should have chosen an environment in which the egalitarian
preferences of the players can be fully expressed and are not suppressed by the
rules of the game.
Recall that the rules of this game strip the responder of his inequity aversion
features. He is restricted to consider only the highest offer, but a person with
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egalitarian preferences (high β) may wish to choose a more egalitarian lower
offer. If the game is changed so as to allow the responder to freely choose one
of the offers, then it will no longer be possible to obtain a competitive outcome
with no restrictions on the calibration. Analogous to the market game with
responders’ competition, here, in order to obtain a competitive outcome, the
responder will have to be sufficiently selfish.
A.3 Selecting the Calibration: The UltimatumGameData.
F&S provide only partial data about proposers’ offers in the UG, and they
provide no data on the responders actions. What little data they present is
insufficient to establish their calibration.
The data on proposers’ offers (Table I, p. 827 [Fehr and Schmidt 1999]) is
incomplete. It does not include intermediate offers (between 0.2, and 0.4) which
were made by 25% of the proposers, nor can we learn from it that 40% of the
proposers offered an equal split. The information about offers in the interval
(0.4, 0.5) is aggregated and amounts to 70% of the offers.
As a source for data on the responders actions, F&S refer to [Roth 1995],
but they do not tell us where in this 95 page long article the data is to be found.
The data which F&S need for their purpose cannot be found in the paper, some
of it may be extracted from the various diagrams in the paper.
The distribution of α was supposed to be derived from the data on Ulti-
matum game, but when they present the distribution, F&S use the following
wording, which suggests that the choice of the values for α was rather unsys-
tematic:
"Thus, we (conservatively) assume that 10% of the subjects have
α = 4 "
"Another, typically much larger fraction of the population insists
on getting at least one-third of the surplus, which implies a value
of α which is equal to one. These are at least 30 percent of the
population."
"Another, say, 30 percent of the subjects insist on getting at least
one quarter, which implies α = 0.5" ( pp. 843− 844).
A.4 The Correlation.
The correlation between α, β, which is essential for explaining the Fehr and
Gächter experiment, was introduced in the appendix (p.864, [Fehr and Schmidt
1999]). There is no mention of it in the main text of the paper. Those readers
who did not read the appendix are not even aware that a correlation has been
added to the calibration of Table III. In fact, the reader is mislead to believe
that the calibration has not been changed, since F&S tell him, when discussing
the Fehr and Gächter experiment (on p.846), that it is consistent with the
calibration of Table III (which has no correlation).
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A.5 Selecting the Calibration: The Use of the Data to be
Explained.
In their reply to my pamphlet ([Fehr and Schmidt 2005], p.7), F&S refer to the
choice of β = 0.6. for the calibration. They admit that they have chosen this
value to be consistent with the required value of proposition 5 :
"Thus, the condition of Proposition 5 requires βi ≥ 0.6. We had
picked the highest possible value of βi to be βi = 0.6 in Table III,
which is just sufficient, but very tight."
It seems that the calibration was selected by using the data of the Fehr and
Gächter experiment, but there is no mention of this in the paper.
The choice of β = 0.6 also satisfies the condition β < 0.83¯ = 5/6. For the
theory to be consistent with the data of [Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere 1997],
there should not be too many individuals with β ≥ 56 = 0.83¯. Although this
condition is explicit in Proposition 3
¡
β < n−1n =
5
6
¢
, F&S do not refer to it in
their calculations. They fail to mention that it is their choice of β = 0.6 < 56
which ensures that all individuals satisfy this condition. In their reply to my
pamphlet (p.6) F&S justify their choice by claiming that values of β ≥ 0.8
imply ‘an extreme degree of inequity aversion’. But their theory allows β to
assume any value < 1, the notion of unacceptable ’extreme degrees of inequity
aversion’ is not mentioned in any of their papers, and must have been introduced
specifically for this argument.
A.6 The Treatment of Data.
In Public Good Games without Punishment, the gap between those who did not
contribute anything in the experiment (73%) and the theory’s prediction (100%)
is of the order of magnitude 36%. Despite this discrepancy, F&S declare that ‘it
seems fair to say that our model is consistent with the bulk of individual choices
in this game’ (p.845).
They refer to this gap in a footnote (footnote 21, p.845), where they make
two points about it. The first is that the gap can be partly closed by theories of
fundamental randomness of human choice, but they leave this research to the
future. The second point is that the gap can be reduced by a significant fraction
of the players who made very small contributions to the public good. However,
they do not produce the data, nor do they provide any information about the
size of this significant fraction of players. This seems particularly odd since the
information could have been added in one single column to Table II (p.838),
whose sole purpose is to summarize the data of these games.
The absence of this information is even more puzzling since E. Fehr refers
to this fraction of subjects in other papers. In two of his papers, E. Fehr refers
to Table II as a meta-study of public good games. He makes specific references
to the significant numbers of individuals who made small contributions and
claims that this was found by the authors (F&S) of this meta-study. He does
not tell his readers that this data is not available in the meta-study and that
it only makes a fleeting appearance in a footnote, [Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, and
Fehr 2003], p.160, [Fehr and Gächter 2000], p.983.
20
B The Contract Experiments
B.1 Quantitatively Accurate Predictions.
In their QJE paper [Fehr and Schmidt 1999], F&S describe their calibration
and their explanation process as ‘crude’ ‘rough’ and as a ‘first test’. Later,
in their invited survey paper to the 8th World Congress of the Econometric
Society, 2000 ([Fehr and Schmidt 2003] p. 222), when they describe their own
work, F&S claim that "Keeping this distribution (the QJE calibration) constant,
they (F&S) show that their model yields quantitatively accurate predictions
across many bargaining, market and co-operation games".
In my pamphlet, I challenged F&S to explain how their ‘crude and rough
tests’ could have produced ‘quantitatively accurate predictions’.
F&S promptly replied to the pamphlet and listed 3 experiments on contract
choice which were not available when they wrote their QJE paper, but were
discussed in their invited paper to the World Congress ([Fehr and Schmidt 2005]
p.8). They state that their results support the model of inequity aversion as
well as the calibration that they used in QJE.
It is these 3 experiments that gave F&S the "confidence to claim that our
model ‘yields quantitatively accurate predictions across many bargaining, mar-
ket, and co-operation games’."
In their reply, F&S list two more papers which allegedly support their theory
and which were not discussed in the invited paper: [Fischbacher, Fong, and
Fehr 2003], [Fehr and Schmidt 2004b]. I do not include these papers in my
discussion here, since the first applies quantal response equilibria, and it is
beyond the scope of this paper to consider the explanatory value of quantal
response theory, and the second is not relevant to the calibrated theory.
Note that in their reply, F&S refer to older versions of the 3 contract papers,
but there is no essential difference between the old and new versions as far as
the experiments and the calibrations are concerned.
B.2 Inequity Aversion Theory Explains the Contract Ex-
periments.
Although F&S do not test the theory’s predictions they claim that the theory
explains the data.
In two of the contract papers F&S state that they intend to explain and
interpret the experimental results with their theory. ([Fehr and Schmidt 2004a]
p.456, [Fehr, Kremhelmer, and Schmidt 2005], p.2).
In [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006b], F&S use a more careful phrasing, saying
that the model offers a ’unified interpretation’, and that the model’s major pre-
dictions are consistent with the observed qualitative pattern of contract choice,
but they hasten to add (on p.4) that the model also makes accurate quantitative
predictions, (I describe these accurate predictions on p.14).
B.3 Some Properties of the 40− 60 Distribution
The new calibration is clearly a set of distributions (since the α, β are not
specified), but F&S do not explicitly refer to it as a set, and they treat it as a
single distribution. In all of the papers it seems that F&S’ aim is to show that
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all the distributions of the 40 − 60 type are compatible with the experimental
data.
The 40−60 distributions preserve two properties of the QJE calibration. Like
the QJE calibration it has 40% individuals with high β0s, and like its predecessor
it maintains a correlation between the two variables, thus the individuals with
high β0s also have high α0s. The first property was presumably extracted from
the data on ultimatum games (although the data was not provided), and the
second property was introduced in an appendix of [Fehr and Schmidt 1999] as
a tribute to reciprocity and an attempt to explain the Fehr and Gächter public
good experiment.
In fact, although F&S claim in their papers to use the 40− 60 calibrations
without any restrictions on the parameters, their proofs hold for a narrower set
of calibrations. In [Fehr, Kremhelmer, and Schmidt 2005] F&S fix all the higher
α0s to be α = 2, this, they claim, is consistent with their QJE paper. The value
α = 2 is not one of the values in the QJE calibration. F&S do not explain what
the meaning of ‘consistent’ is in this context.
In the other two papers, F&S change the calibration in the unpublished
appendix, without informing the reader that the proofs do not apply to the
general 40−60 calibration. In the appendix to [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006b],
F&S change all the higher values of the parameters to be α = 2, β = 0.6. They
do not even claim that this can be done without loss of generality.
The full extent of F&S’ somewhat unorthodox methods is fully revealed in
[Fehr and Schmidt 2004a] and in its unpublished appendix [Fehr and Schmidt
2004c]. In the text (p.470) F&S define individuals with α, β ≥ 0.5 as inequity
averse individuals, and those with α, β < 0.5 as selfish. They then declare that
’following’ the QJE calibration there are 40% inequity averse individuals and
60% selfish ones. Whatever the meaning of ‘following’ in this context may be,
this statement is false since the QJE calibration has 30% individuals who do
not belong to either of the two categories (individuals with α = 0.5, β = 0.25).
The reader may not be aware that by ’following’ the QJE calibration some 30%
of its individuals were eliminated.
In the first page of the unpublished appendix [Fehr and Schmidt 2004c],
where all proofs are to be found, F&S redefine selfish individuals to have α =
β = 0, (i.e. no longer α, β < 0.5). This change is not mentioned in the main
text of the paper, and all proofs in the appendix apply to this new version.
B.4 Incompatibility of the 40 − 60 Distribution with the
Experiments in the QJE paper.
The 40− 60 distribution is not compatible with the experiments in the QJE ar-
ticle (with the exception of the market experiment with proposers’ competition,
where the competitive outcome is independent of the population).
Compatibility with the market experiment with responders’ competition re-
quires that there be enough individuals with β < 0.83¯, this is not guaranteed
for all 40− 60 distributions.
For the public good games without punishment, the theory with the 40− 60
population predicts that about 100%make no contributions, this is incompatible
with the data, in which only 73% made no contributions.
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The theory is incompatible with the Fehr and Gächter experiment. Proposi-
tion 5 requires that all individuals with β > 0 have β ≥ 0.6 (and correspondingly
high values of α0s). This is not guaranteed for all of the 40− 60 distributions.
In addition, the 40− 60 distribution is incompatible with the data on Ulti-
matum Games, which F&S used to calibrate their model. In the experimental
Ultimatum Game data, as presented in QJE, 30% of the individuals have inter-
mediate inequity aversion parameters.
B.5 Playing Down the Differences Between the 40 − 60
Distribution and the QJE Calibration.
The two calibrations, that of QJE and the new 40−60 one, are incompatible, as
neither explains the experiments that the other was designed to explain. Yet,
F&S do not mention this incompatibility in their papers. They do not tell their
readers why they have switched to the new distribution, nor do they explain
the significance of this change.
In fact, they do not even present the new distribution as a new one. They
downplay the move to the 40−60 distribution and present the new distribution
as following the QJE calibration, as being in accordance with, or as an aggregated
and simplified version of the QJE calibration ([Fehr and Schmidt 2004a], p.470,
[Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006b],p.22, and footnote 15, [Fehr, Kremhelmer, and
Schmidt 2005], p.22, ).
F&S do not explain what it means for two completely different distributions
to be ‘in accordance’ with each other, nor why it is permitted in this case to
‘aggregate and simplify’ or to ‘follow’ a distribution
B.6 The Relevance of the 40− 60 Distribution for Testing
the Theory.
Although F&S disregard the quantitative predictions of the 40− 60 calibration
they make the reader believe that this distribution is relevant for testing the the
contract experiments.
Recall that F&S have publicly declared that in the contract papers, the
inequity aversion theory produces quantitatively accurate predictions. These
quantitative predictions must be those of the theory calibrated with the 40−60
distribution which is used in these papers.
In the contract papers F&S repeat their claim that the QJE calibration is
successful in explaining experiments accurately. They also present the 40− 60
distribution as a minor and innocuous variation of the QJE calibration which is
suitable for the contract papers (see appendix B.5). The reader may be justified
in believing that the 40− 60 distribution is relevant for explaining the contract
experiments.
For the statements about the success of the QJE calibration see [Fehr and
Schmidt 2004a], p.470, [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006b], p.21 and footnote 16,
and [Fehr, Kremhelmer, and Schmidt 2005], p.20, 23 and footnote 18.
Any remaining doubt about the relevance of the 40 − 60 distribution is
removed when reading F&S’ repeated proclamation in [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt
2006b] that the model ‘offers remarkably precise quantitative predictions of the
data’. The quantitative predictions they refer to in these statements are clearly
based on the 40− 60 distribution, (I describe these predictions on p.14).
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B.7 A Larger Set of Distributions
In two of the contract papers F&S mention in passing that the qualitative prop-
erties hold for a wider set of distributions. Like the 40− 60 distributions, these
are distributions with two types of individuals: the selfish and the fair ones but
with different proportions. Thus, these distributions preserve the perfect cor-
relation between the α, β parameters but allow deviations from the assumption
of 40% fair individuals.
In [Fehr and Schmidt 2004a], p.470, F&S state that "The qualitative results
are robust to changes in this distribution as long as there is a significant fraction
of both inequity-averse and selfish players." No detailed range for these fractions
can be found in the paper nor in its unpublished appendix.
In [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006b] p.25, F&S state that "... the qualitative
results that follow are robust to changes in this distribution, as long as the share
of fair types is at least 33 percent but not larger than 60 percent". There is no
direct proof in the paper (or its appendix) that this is the relevant range, the
figure 33 does not appear in the proofs.
In [Fehr, Kremhelmer, and Schmidt 2005] F&S do not claim that the propo-
sitions hold for a wider range of distributions. Indeed, a small change in the
distribution renders their equilibrium invalid. A small increase, of 1.18%, in the
group of fair individuals (i.e. the distribution becomes 41.18− 58.82 instead of
40−60) may cause some fair agents (with α0s close to 0.5) to behave like selfish
agents.
B.8 The Robustness of the Equilibrium
F&S consider equilibria in which all the individuals of a certain type behave
identically: Selfish agents expend high effort, fair ones shirk, fair principals
pay selfish agents a bonus and selfish principals pay no bonus. To support these
equilibria, the frequencies of the fair and selfish players in the population should
be such that the selfish players would wish to cooperate and that all the fair
agents would wish to ‘shirk’. The equilibrium breaks down if the percentage of
fair principals in the population is too low to support the cooperation of the
selfish agents, it may also break down if there are too many fair principals, this
may induce some of the fair agents to cooperate rather than shirk.
The parameters of the contract games (the production and cost functions)
were carefully selected to ensure that in equilibrium all the fair agents play the
same strategy, irrespective of their unspecified inequity aversion parameters.
The production and cost functions guarantee that an agent expending high
effort receives in the expected allocation (after the bonus), less than a quarter
of the whole cake. This, in turn, guarantees that all the fair agents (with
α > 0.5) reject this allocation and choose a less efficient but more egalitarian
allocation. However, the parameters of the game can be easily altered so that
in the expected allocation the agent’s share is more than a 14 of the whole cake.
In that case, some of the fair agents with α ∼ 0.5 may be induced to cooperate.
The principals are, of course, interested to get the cooperation of more agents
and will choose the wage appropriately. F&S do not tell their readers that the
equilibrium is not robust to changes in the game parameters.
If equilibrium fails because of partial cooperation of the fair agents then in
order to obtain a new equilibrium it will be necessary to assume a calibration
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which has more than two types. The new calibration would either violate the
perfect correlation between α, β by including individuals with high β0s but a
low α - as principals they would be fair and as agents selfish, or else the cali-
bration will have to detail the distribution of α0s among the fair agents, so as
to enable the principals to induce some fair agents to cooperate. In any case,
a distribution with two types of individuals (like the 40 − 60 distribution) will
no longer suffice to describe the equilibrium behavior. F&S will have to change
their calibration yet again. It also means that F&S will need to compute equi-
libria for populations with more than two types, which they have not done so
far.
In a seminar Klaus Schmidt gave in Bonn in October 2005 (in the presence
of Professors C. Engel, M. Hellwig and U. Schweizer), he admitted that he tried
to apply the QJE calibration to the Fehr-Klein-Schmidt model but failed to find
an equilibrium because of the multiple (four) types in the calibration.
B.9 The Contract Experiments: Testing the Theory
We use the following method for the tests: we assume that the empirical be-
havior follows the suggested equilibrium and estimate the percentages of fair
principals and fair agents in the population. The fraction of agents who expend
low effort is an estimate for the fraction of fair agents, similarly, the fraction
of fair principals can be estimated by computing the fraction of principals who
rewarded agents who exerted high effort. We then check whether the estimated
population agrees with the calibrations.
When we compare the theory’s predictions with the data we find large dis-
agreements between the two. The fractions of fair agents (those who make a
low effort) and of fair principals (those who reward high effort) that we find in
the data are inconsistent with the calibrations considered by F&S.
If there is anything to be learnt from the data it is that there is no perfect
correlation between the parameters α, β and that no single calibration can ex-
plain the different experiments. The attempt to explain all three experiments
with a distribution similar to the 40− 60 distribution has failed.
In two of the experiments ([Fehr and Schmidt 2004a], [Fehr, Kremhelmer,
and Schmidt 2005]), the data suggests that the number of fair principals (who
pay the bonus) is much larger than the number of fair agents (who shirk). In the
first paper the number of fair principals is 3 times that of the fair agents, and
in the second paper it is 13 times. This is incompatible with the distribution
which F&S assume to prove their propositions. The different proportions of fair
agents to fair principals in the two experiments suggests that the calibrations
required to explain the data will differ drastically between the experiments.
Those few individuals who shirked despite the almost certain bonus, must
have very large α0s. If F&S were to look for a calibration that describes the
data they will have to assume a particular distribution of α0s among the fair
individuals. It seems, that in order to explain the data it is required either to
relax the perfect correlation between α, β (by introducing individuals with high
β0s but low α0s), or else have more information about the distribution of α0s
among the fair individuals. In any case the calibration will no longer be the
40− 60 distribution, and it will have to have more than the two types assumed
by F&S..
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Moreover, in [Fehr and Schmidt 2004a], the empirical average payoff of an
agent is double the predicted payoff, bonuses are not paid to equalize the pay-
offs of the agent and the principal, and at least 25% of the agents do not act
according to the calibrated theory.
In [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006b], the proportions are reversed, the data
suggests that there are more fair agents than fair principals. The low fraction
of fair principals suggested by the data does not support any cooperation in the
theoretical model. There seems to be more cooperation in the experiment than
the theory can explain. In addition, the bonuses paid in the experiment do not
equalize the payoffs of the principal and the agent, whereas the theory assumes
that bonuses are paid to achieve equality.
We now describe the tests for each of the papers:
Fehr and Schmidt 2004a
In [Fehr and Schmidt 2004a], according to the equilibrium of the bonus
contract, all principals pay a wage of w = 225, selfish agents expend (total) high
effort e = 20, and are paid by the fair principals a bonus of 350. Fair agents
expend a (total) effort of e = 12, and are paid no bonus. Proposition 2 ([Fehr
and Schmidt 2004c], p.A − 10) lists all pooling equilibria for any permissible
fractions q of fair players in the population, Proposition 3, selects one of these
with the help of a refinement-like argument, (Condition 1 in p.A− 11).
We find that the data is incompatible with the theory in many ways. The
theory predicts that the fair agents make a low total effort of e = 12, taking
the range of (total) effort levels 10− 14, we find that the fraction of those who
made efforts in this range is: 55/261 = 21%, (Table 2, p.463). This suggests
that the percentage of fair agents is 21%. Taking the interval [18, 20] for the
high effort level e = 20, the percentage of those who made an effort ≥ 18 is
93/261 = 35.6%, suggesting that the percentage of selfish agents is 35.6%. This
leaves 43.4% of agents who do not behave according to the theory. Indeed,
about 25.6% of the agents made total efforts e = 2, 3, 4, these effort levels are
incompatible with the theory.
There is no detailed data on the paid bonuses in the paper, we therefore
use the following method to estimate the percentage of fair principals in the
population. The average bonus paid for the high effort levels 18, 19, 20 is about
211 (Table 2 on p.463 and figure 3 on p.464): 2424+6+63 ∗ 120 +
6
24+6+63 ∗ 170 +
63
24+6+63 ∗ 250 = 211.29. A fair principal pays a bonus of 350 in the equilibrium,
the estimated fraction of fair principals in the data is therefore: 211350 = 60.3%.
This is about 3 times the estimated percentage of fair agents (21%) . This is
incompatible with the calibrations assumed by F&S.
We also compare the theoretical and empirical average payoff of an agent.
The empirical average payoff of an agent is about 400, (according to figure 4 on
p. 467). The theoretical average payoff of an agent is:
[75 + 350q] (1− q) + 155q,
where q is the fraction of fair players, 75 is the equilibrium pre-bonus payoff of
a selfish agent, and 155 is the payoff of a fair agent. The maximal value of this
function is: 207. The maximum possible theoretical average payoff of an agent
is about half the empirical one.
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According to the theory bonuses are paid to equalize the payoffs of the
principal and the agent, we test whether the data confirms it. Let v, c be the
production and cost functions (of effort), and w, b be the wage and bonus paid.
Equating the payoffs of the principal and agent implies: b = v+c2 − w. Given
the frequencies of pairs of efforts in the experiment (Table 2, p.463), we can
calculate the average v+c2 for any range of efforts. There is no information in
the paper about the wage paid, I will, therefore, assume it to be the equilibrium
wage w = 225. Thus we can calculate the average bonus which would have
equated payoffs, for a certain range of efforts. Using Table 2 (frequencies of
efforts, p.463) and Figure 3 (average bonus paid per effort level, p. 464) we can
compute the average bonus that was actually paid for this range of efforts. We
can then compare the two.
The effort range that I consider is e1 + e2 ≥ 13, since for total effort ≤ 12,
and for w = 225, the principal’s payoff is lower than the agent’s and he cannot
pay a bonus. For all the cases of total effort e1 + e2 ≥ 13 the principal can pay
a bonus.
For the range of total efforts e1+e2 ≥ 13 the average bonus (actually) paid is
about 180.73, while the average bonus required to equalize the payoffs is 245.77,
the discrepancy between the two is higher than 35%
¡
245.77−180.73
180.73
¢
. = 35.98%
If we allow the bonuses not to equate the payoffs but to set the agent’s payoff
at 80% of the principal’s, the gap reduces to about 15%. Clearly the bonuses
were not paid in order to equalize payoffs.
There were 60 subjects in the relevant part of this experiment and 257 ob-
servations.
Fehr, Klein and Schmidt 2006 (Forthcoming in Econometrica)
In the equilibria of [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006b], with the calibration
considered by F&S, all principals pay a wage w = 15, selfish agents make an
effort of 7 and the fair principals pay them a bonus of 25, fair agents make a
low effort e = 2 and no principal pays them a bonus.
Table V in the paper, describes the bonus to effort relation under bonus
contract in two sessions of the experiment (S3 − S4). According to this table,
low efforts ≤ 3 were made in 55198 = 27.7% of the cases, suggesting that the
percentage of fair agents is 27.7%. High efforts ≥ 5 were expended in 127 of
the cases. Of those who made high efforts, the fraction of those who received
a bonus ≥ 21 is 36127 = 28.3%. This suggests that the fraction of fair principals
(who pay the bonus) is 28.3%. The numbers of fair agents and principals are
about the same.
A word on the intervals I chose to represent the equilibrium values: the effort
scale is rather coarse: the integers 1− 10. I therefore allowed an individual who
chooses an effort level e = 2, to err 50% and choose an effort in the interval
[1, 3] . For the equilibrium wage w = 15, the effort level e = 1 results in a very
unequal allocation:(15,−5) , yet, I take it to be a proxy for e = 2. If it were
not the fair agents who chose e = 1, then we are left with 24% of the agents¡
91
376 = 24.2%
¢
who choose an effort level which is incompatible with the theory.
I apply a similar argument for taking the efforts interval [5, 10] to represent
high efforts (e = 7) , due to the coarsness of the effort scale, I allow the agent
to err 28% downwards and 43% upwards.
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Bonuses were selected from a finer scale, the integers 1 − 40. The theory
predicts that when the agent made the effort e = 7 and was paid a wage w = 15,
the bonus paid should equate the payoffs of an agent and the principal. A bonus
of 18 (the average of the range 16 − 20) results in an unequal allocation, it
leads to an allocation (15− 10 + 18, 70− 15− 18) = (23, 37) in which the agent
receives only 62% of the principals’s share. I therefore consider the bonuses in
the interval [21, 40] .
F&S have pooled the data of all the bonus contract games of the various
treatments (sessions S3 − S6) in Table 5 of the unpublished appendix [Fehr,
Klein, and Schmidt 2006a]. They inform us that there is no statistically signifi-
cant difference in the bonus-effort relation between the two tables (Result 6 (b) ,
p.19). Indeed, we run the same test for the fractions of fair principals and fair
agents on the pooled data, and obtain similar results with one major difference.
The fraction of fair principals is 23.9%
¡
= 51213
¢
, but the fraction of fair agents
is much higher: 34.5%
¡
= 130376
¢
, i.e. there seem to be significantly more fair
agents than fair principals (about 44% more) . This is incompatible with F&S’s
assumption of perfect correlation between α, β.
The fact that the data of sessions S3− S4 suggests a different composition
of population than the data for sessions S3− S6 shows that there is little hope
to find a single calibration that will explain all experiments. In all the sessions
the bonus contract game was played, the sessions differ in their framing and in
the number of contract types that the principals may select from.
Both tables agree that the percentage of fair principals is low, between 23.9
and 28.3%. According to F&S the equilibrium they consider (or rather its ‘qual-
itative results’ in their formulation) holds when the percentage of fair principals
is not lower than 33%, but they make no claims about the existence of equi-
librium for lower percentages. We show, under very weak assumptions, that
for any q, and any calibration with a fraction q of fair principals (high β0s),
the data is incompatible with this calibration. This means that there is more
agents’ cooperation in the experiment than the theory (as presented by F&S)
can possibly support. (Note that we make no further assumptions about the
population, except assuming that there is a fraction q of players with β > 0.5).
For a given q, we find the effort level eS that a selfish agent will expend
when he believes that a fraction q of the principals will reward him. This level
is a function of q only and not of the wage paid by the principal (see lemma
2, [Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2006a]). The total compensation paid by a fair
principal to an agent who made the effort eS is b+w =
v(eS)+c(eS)
2 , where v, c
are the production and cost functions, respectively The theory predicts that
b+w should be paid by the q fair principals to those agents who made the effort
eS . F&S inform us that the wage w was close to 15 throughout the experiment.
Using Table V, we can, therefore, find out what percentage of the principals paid
a bonus of
∙
v(eS)+c(eS)
2 − 15
¸
to those agent who made the effort eS . Then, we
can compare it with the assumed fraction q. We find that the two values never
agree.
The calculation is rather tedious and is presented below.
The function eS (q) is a step function, because the cost function is a piece-
wise linear function.
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• For q < 0.1818, the selfish agent will choose e = 1, there is no equilibrium
with cooperation.
• For all q0s in the interval [0.1818, 0.33) the selfish agent will choose e = 3.
The bonus is: b = 10∗3+22 −15 = 1. Out of 156 who chose e ≥ 3, about 127
were paid bonuses b ≥ 1, suggesting that the fraction of fair principals is
127
156 = 0.814. This value is outside the relevant interval of q
0s. The data
is incompatible with calibrations chosen in this range of q0s. But there
is more incompatibility: for w = 15 (the actual wage paid) there cannot
be any cooperation in this range, the selfish agents will choose not to
cooperate (in the equilibrium the wage should be ≤ 9.9), however, in the
experiment about 50% of the agents exerted high efforts ≥ 6 .
This range of q0s is an example of how sensitive the analysis is to the
parameters. If we follow F&S and the data, and take a two type calibration
with about 28% of fair and 72% of selfish players, we will need to know
more about the distribution of α, β among the fair players in order to
compute the actions of the fair agents. The effort exerted by a fair agent
(with both α, β > 0.5) depends on the exact values of α, β. He will choose
e = 1, or e = 2 depending on whether α is close to β or much larger. This,
in turn, affects the wage chosen by the principal.
With further assumptions on the populations we may succeed in finding
an equilibrium which will have a low degree of cooperation, the agents’
efforts will all be ≤ 3. This makes the bonus contract rather unattractive,
and it now becomes questionable whether the principals will choose the
bonus contract in their first move. Depending on the cost of practicing
punishments (verification costs) in the incentive contracts, the principals
may find the incentive contract more attractive, contrary to the behavior
in the experiment.
• For all q0s in [0.33, 0.46) the selfish agent chooses e = 7. The bonus is:
b = 10∗7+102 − 15 = 25. We test for e ≥ 5, b ≥ 21, and find that the
estimated fraction of fair principals is 36127 = 0.283, outside this range.
• For all q0s in [0.46, 0.571) the selfish agent chooses e = 9. The bonus is:
b = 10∗9+162 − 15 = 38. We take the range e ≥ 7, b ≥ 31. Out of 82
who exert high efforts 9 were given bonuses, the estimated fraction of fair
principals 982 = 0.109, is well below the relevant range of q
0s.
• For all q ≥ 0.571 the selfish agent chooses e = 10. The bonus is: b =
10∗10+20
2 − 15 = 45.We test for e ≥ 8, b ≥ 36 and find that out of 46, only
6 were paid bonuses, 646 = 0.13, which is not in the relevant range.
It follows that there is no q and no calibration with q fair agents that is
compatible with the data of this experiment. The only equilibrium for a pop-
ulation (with two types, as considered by F&S) and with a low percentage of
fair principals (as suggested by the data) will have very little cooperation, all
agents will expend low efforts.
The theory predicts (or rather assumes) that positive bonuses are paid in
order to equate the payoffs of the agent and the principal. We can test whether
the data confirms it. To perform this test we need to know the empirical wage
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paid to the agent, F&S do not provide detailed information about the wage paid,
they provide only the average wages as a function of time (figure 5). To test
whether the principals attempted to equate payoffs via the bonuses, I assume
that the wage paid was w = 15, this is the theoretical wage and it also happens
to be the average empirical wage. I compute the fraction of bonuses which give
the agent at least 80% of the principal’s share, these are the bonuses for which
b+ w ≥ 0.8v+c1.8 .
We consider only bonuses ≥ 6, (assuming that those principals who paid a
bonus below 6, are selfish and meant to pay 0). We find that of the bonuses
≥ 6, only 44106 = 41.5% were close to equating the payoffs of the agent and
the principal, whereas the theory predicts that all positive bonuses equate the
payoffs. For the pooled data of Table 5 of the unpublished appendix [Fehr,
Klein, and Schmidt 2006a], the fraction of the bonuses which roughly equate
the payoffs is 43.7%. Clearly, the bonuses paid in the experiment are not meant
to equate the payoff of the principal and the agent.
F&S claim that the bonuses paid in the experiment form a substantial part
of the agent’s compensation. They calculate the average bonus paid in the
experiment (10.4) and the average wage (15) . The bonus part of the total com-
pensation to the agent is: 10.425.4 = 40.9% We now compute this ratio for the
equilibrium (of the 40− 60 calibration). The average bonus is 25 ∗ 0.4 ∗ 0.6 = 6,
the wage is 15, hence the theoretical bonus part of the agent’s total compensa-
tion is: 615+6 = 28.5%. This is much lower than the experimental value, 40.9%.
Again, there seems to be more cooperation in the experiment than the theory
permits.
We briefly compare the equilibrium with the experimental behavior under
an incentive contract. According to the theory, (Proposition 2, p. A− 3, [Fehr,
Klein, and Schmidt 2006a]), all principals demand an effort level of e∗ = 4, the
selfish principals offer a wage of w = 4 and the fair ones w = 17. All agents
accept the fair offer and fair agents reject the selfish offer. Comparing this with
the data (the first part of Table III) the percentage of fair principals, who made
a high wage offer is 26/56 = 46.4%. The percentage of fair agents, those who
reject a low wage offer is: 8/26 = 30.7%, substantially lower than the fraction
of fair principals. In addition, the average payoff of a principal does not match.
In the experiment it is 8.6. According to the theory, the average payoff is a
weighted average of 15.6 and 13 : 15.6(1 − q) + 13q where q is the fraction of
fair principals, this is well above 8.6 for all q0s.
There were 88 subjects in this experiment and 376 observations.
Fehr, Kremhelmer and Schmidt 2005
The case of [Fehr, Kremhelmer, and Schmidt 2005] is straightforward. Here
the propositions were proved for the 40 − 60 distribution, F&S do not claim
that they hold for a wider set of distributions. Indeed, a small increase in
the percentage of fair principals can destroy the equilibrium, (increasing the
percentage of fair principals to 41.2% will make a fair agent with α close to 0.5
cooperate like a selfish agent).
For this game the theory predicts (propositions 3, 4 pp. 25, 26) that a selfish
B player makes the effort b = 10, and a fair one sets b = 1. A selfish A player
chooses the effort a = 1 and a fair A sets his a to equal b.
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According to Table 3 on p.17, the fraction of B agents who chose low effort
levels 1, 2, 3 is 10187 = 5.34%, suggesting that the percentage of fair agents is
5.34%.
Of those B players who expended high efforts (b = 8, 9, 10), a fraction
108/155 = 69.67% were rewarded by a high effort of the A player, this sug-
gests that the percentage of fair principals is 69.67%.
There is a huge gap between the percentages of fair agents and fair principals.
This is incompatible with F&S’ calibration. Moreover, this high percentage of
fair principals (69.67%) cannot support the equilibrium considered by F&S,
if the percentage of fair principals is higher than 41.2 then some fair agents
(depending on their α values) may cooperate.
If we assume that there are 69.67% fair individuals with high α0s and β0s,
it may be possible to explain the data by assuming that the high percentage
of fair principals induced most of the fair agents to cooperate, leaving behind
the 5.34% who shirked. Those who shirked must have very large α0s to make
them reject the nearly certain bonus. All the other fair agents must have lower
α0s which induce them to cooperate. This explanation amounts to assuming a
particular distribution of the α0s within the fair group which depends on the
percentage of fair principals.
There were 44 subjects in this treatment and there were 187 observations.
The above computations do not change significantly when we combine this test
with the JOD treatment (Table 2 p.13), the combined sample size is 487 with
132 subjects.
B.10 Rhetorical Devices
The danger of embarking on a project without a clear methodological plan
becomes apparent when we consider the entirety of the papers. The whole
project is shrouded in mist. F&S choose their calibration by using data they
want to explain, but hide this fact from the reader. They manipulate and modify
the calibration in an appendix but do not mention it in the main text of the
paper. They prove a theorem that does not apply to their calibration but claim
that it explains the data.
In the contract papers, F&S change the calibration, but do not discuss the
problematic nature of this change. Instead, they use vague, ambiguous word-
ing to hide the change. In their unpublished appendices they manipulate the
calibration yet again, without informing the readers that the proofs apply only
to the manipulated version. The new calibration provides detailed predictions
which do not agree with the experimental data. F&S do not even attempt to
test these predictions, they simply ignore them without giving any reason for it.
The predictions strongly disagree with the experimental data, yet on the basis
of some rudimentary features F&S claim that the theory largely fits the data.
When the data accidentally agrees with the theory on some averages, although
the underlying distributions are wide apart, F&S repeatedly hail this find as an
‘accurate quantitative prediction’.
Judging from the methods they use in the contract papers, F&S no longer
believe in the existence of a single calibration that can explain all their exper-
iments. Yet, they use vague phrases so as to make the reader believe that the
project still runs in its announced course.
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All this does not prevent F&S from claiming, in the public discussion of their
theory on the internet, in survey papers written for distinguished societies and
in learned handbooks that they have kept their calibration constant and that
their calibrated theory yields accurate predictions of the data.
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